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Abstract 
In the following work, I will try to trace, in general lines, the way in 
which the matter of happiness is perceived in The Nicomachean 
Ethics. At the same time, I will also touch on the subject of the 
perspectives that emerge and reflect from the considered work. For 
that matter, I will follow the way in which Aristotle has enunciated the 
matter, so that then call into requisition various perspectives in order 
to emphasize that happiness can’t be pursued or methodically 
conceived. Even though the matter is methodically transposed and 
traced, the simple browsing makes it emerge from the directions 
established in the initial program. What I am here pleading for is that 
the work doesn’t have an amphibological structure, not because it 
respects by itself certain norms demanded by the logics’ common 
sense, but because it couldn’t be conceived in exclusively logic terms. 
If we follow Aristotle’s ethic, we will see, without difficulty, that the 
work’s purpose is practical. From where we can easily indicate that 
the need to methodically articulate the ethic’s program is no longer 
necessary by itself.  
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1. The theory of purposes 
Any art, activity or even human aspiration has tended through 
its very essence for better. From here the idea that any activity must 
have a goal, a purpose; for example, the purpose of medical 
investigations would be health, in the case of the army - victory, of the 
welfare economy. And then, if there are a lot of doctrines, sciences 
with a multitude of goals to achieve, some smaller and less important 
than their sales space, then they will all end up converting to one last 
goal - that being the good. That is why it is worth thinking about it and 
being put at the center of any epistemic analysis, and not only: “So if 
what is done has some end that we want for its own sake, and 
everything else we want is for the sake of this end; and if we do not 
choose everything for the sake of something else (because this would 
lead to an infinite progression, making our desire fruitless and vain), 
then clearly this will be the good, indeed the chief good.” (Aristotle, 
2004, p.4) And what science could be trusted in doing so? The 
political one - because most of the goals in a society are gathered and 
absorbed in politics, more precisely by appealing to the law, to the 
administrative apparatus:” Since political science employs the other 
sciences, and also lays down laws about what we should do and 
refrain from, its end will include the ends of the others, and will 
therefore be the human good.” (Aristotle, 2004, p.4)  
The state therefore becomes a kind of manager of the 
community, but also of the individual good. More precisely, of the 
human good. But how the state can make the difference between a 
personal good and an impersonal one that is great, and not desirable 
and attractive as the individual good is, remains to be seen! Because 
the good of the community, as it appears here, is supreme, and all of 
the other aspirations are nothing else but goals in viewing of the final 
good, the foremost good. But even if certain activities are precise, 
with well-defined purposes, the structure of good, if we can call it like 
that, is not easy to grasp, which further strengthens the idea that good 
is maintained not only by nature, but even more so, by conventions, 
by directions that cannot be calculated and analyzed exclusively 
methodically: ”The spheres of what is noble and what is just, which 
political science examines, admit of a good deal of diversity and 
variation, so that they seem to exist only by convention and not by 
nature.” (Aristotle, 2004, p. 5) And this is because the good, as it was 
understood by some, had and proved to have serious consequences, 
even if its role had to be firm and noble. Here, Aristotle even states 
that some were brought to their knees by courage, and others were 
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destroyed by wealth. So, great attention is required to the 
generalizations that are made on the basis of other generalizations, 
reaching a kind of final solution regarding what is good and what is 
bad. However, one thing must be highlighted. He who leans on the 
good must be prepared not to be overwhelmed by feelings. Political 
science cannot be thought of and implemented by a novice, by a man 
driven by passion - even if the tendency can be eclectic, combining 
action, passion with definite and firm reason. 
2. The ultimate purpose - happiness 
If we go deeper and look at all of the implications, then we will 
see that happiness (eudaimonia) is the ultimate goal, the ultimate 
purpose: “So: To flourish (and prosper) is our ultimate goal. It (means 
living a life that) meets all our needs. It’s the goal of everything we 
do.” (Aristotle, EEI1097b20) At the level of the masses, happiness is 
mundane, it is closely linked to daily life, to certain benefits in relation 
to certain costs, strictly punctual things. For the sophisticated ones, 
happiness would be the intellectual activity, the goal or the way in 
which the world they live in can be conceived and thought. Some 
might say that this is the condition by which other good things 
become possible. At this level, Aristotle does not seem to go into 
detail. But as Anthony Kenny (1995) says the equivalent of happiness 
would be the act of doing good and behaving well.  
However, the analysis of the good must start from the subject; 
In a way, it must find his own foundation. Then the good should be 
thought by starting from principles or from those things that lead to 
principles? Aristotle does not hesitate and starts from the assumption 
that everything that can be known, fulfilling somewhat epistemic 
requirements, must find its basis at the border between direct and 
mediated knowledge (mediated knowledge (by deduction - formal 
syllogistic structure) / direct knowledge (by sensitive intuition or 
intellectual intuition - nous).  
But what about happiness? Can be found a strainer to filter all 
the conceptions regarding this problematic term? In the following, I 
will draw a path to elucidate some of the problems related to the 
condition of happiness. First, we have commentators who say that 
happiness is a compositum, a bridge between the goals outlined 
above. At the same time, a necessary condition for fulfilling the vital 
functions in the society. Therefore, happiness is intertwined with 
ethics, but it is not in essence identifying with it. We are actually 
dealing with a norm, with different degrees of perceiving happiness, 
not with strict, exclusive forms specific to "happiness".  
 Consequently, as it appears in this context of interpretation, 
happiness is rather related to a certain monitorization. You can't 
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perceive truly the essence of happiness if you do not go through 
certain gradual, punctual stages of your daily life. That's how it seems 
at this point. (Mureşan, 2011) And at the same time, you can't talk 
about happiness if it hasn't reached a final point, from where a clear 
line can be drawn. We could say that Aristotle cannot go beyond the 
method. (Mureşan, 2007) For a thing to be complete, it must first of all 
have an end. And happiness, if we try to comprehend it, to take it out 
of the state of unhiding, as phenomenologists would say (Kontos, 
2002) must have, to lead to an end point. This perspective of 
happiness is not much different from the accounting approach: 
“Finally, Aristotle accepts Solon’ s dictum calls no man eudaimon until 
he is dead, not because it is only when dead that he can be 
eudaimon – that would be absurd (1100a 13, 1100a 34) - but 
because when one judges someone eudaimon that is a judgement 
about his whole life, and his whole life can only be known when it has 
ended.” (Bostock, 2000, p. 12). 
 Another grid of interpretation would be reduced to the concept 
of "fulfilled life". At least that's the way it is for Gerard J. Hughes. He 
considers the term eudaimonia to be problematic, and the only way to 
approach it would be to perceive the concept in terms of relevance to 
a fulfilled life. And then a new problem arises - How do we know how 
to recognize a fulfilled life? Well, neither can the author give a 
reasonable answer: „We simply do not know what fulfilled life is. 
Indeed, the examples which Aristotle has just considered might 
suggest that it is a mistake to suppose that fulfilment can be just one 
thing, like pleasure, or reputation, or money.” (Hughes, 2001, p. 27) 
But even if we do not have a clear position, it suggests that life cannot 
be fulfilled if it does not agree with a certain virtue. Which also 
involves an activity. For, virtue cannot be staged if it is not 
accompanied by a certain activity. However, many commentators like 
Gerard J. Hughes have pointed out that Aristotle's ethical theory of 
happiness ultimately settles down to selfishness. If a multitude of 
doctrines converge towards an ultimate goal, and that is directly 
related to the mundane purpose, the purpose of the city, and 
therefore of the individual, then we are certainly dealing with a 
subject-centered analysis (Toner, 2006). We have another 
interpretation of happiness: “According to the interpretation I have 
been defending, Aristotle equates happiness with perfect virtuous 
activity of the rational soul, and with that good alone. More precisely, 
perfect happiness consists in excellent theoretical activity, and 
secondary happiness consists in excellent practical activity. The two 
lives devoted to these two ends contain many other intrinsic goods 
besides virtuous activity, but none of these subordinate ends is itself 
a component of happiness. Human goals are thus arranged in a 
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hierarchy, and happiness is identified not with the whole of that 
hierarchy but with its pinnacle.” (Kraut, 1989, p. 268) Here, happiness 
appears in a certain hierarchical order, but focuses on two types of 
view.  Actually, we have the concept of happiness, but it must be 
seen in terms of its practical resonance. And at the same time, 
through its rational relevance. And happiness would then be seen in 
the light of a hierarchy that derives from the purposes of the two 
goals, practical, rational. To the extent that this is reflected, happiness 
is not precisely identified with some of the goals. It would be, thought 
in these terms, the purpose of a whole, the support of human 
activities. However, we also have other options, various 
commentators stating that happiness is an intellectual activity: „The 
maximization of contemplative activity, Aristotle thinks, is therefore 
subject to the constraint that it can be maximized only through actions 
that are consistent with the various virtutes.” (Pakaluk, 2005, p. 325.) 
The upper part, the supreme good, would then be reduced to 
problems of a metaphysical nature. Which may be absurd, - 
according to Aristotle – is that the supreme good sustains the 
sequence of activities, but does not identify itself literally with any 
purpose derived from them. Certainly, philosophical activity plays an 
important role in the growth of the individual, it represents, if you will, 
a higher weight, but it is not, in essence, enough to state strongly that 
happiness is strictly capacity and love of wisdom. This would be the 
exclusivist approach, as has been commented on over the years. 
Looking back, after listing so many interpretations, we can 
draw the line. First of all, all those who say that happiness is thought 
purely methodical, must keep in mind that the answer about 
happiness should have been unanimously accepted. If happiness is 
drawn purely methodically, following well-structured schemes, then 
the answer to happiness should be accurate too - which is not 
happening. As we have shown above, happiness has been 
interpreted in various ways, from a fulfilled life to superior activities. 
Even Aristotle, in dealing with the problem, tries to show very clearly 
that, pursuing the same goal, you can take it in different directions. 
Which may sound a little messy, but if you go beyond metaphor, you 
get to the heart of the matter. 
Another thing that comes to strengthen my assumed position 
here. The method, however how well structured would be, cannot be 
essentially susceptible just for objectivity. In every logical construction 
there are fragments of subjectivity. Relativity is a component part of 
the system. Whatever we try to look at, we will come just to this 
statement. And then, all of the commentators who try to extract the 
essence of Aristotle's discourse forget exactly this thing - the 
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possibility that the statements to be antagonistic, free from epistemic 
content, but loaded with practical, mundane and finally real content. 
It is normal to have head-to-head statements, as long as 
Nicomachean Ethics is a work of practical purpose. If it had remained 
in the plan of the exact sciences, then we could have spoken of an 
anomaly of the argument. But as long as the work makes the 
transition to politics, we can no longer have epistemic claims, of 
exact, precise support, of some axioms that do not even exist. Of 
course, Aristotle uses a lot of arguments, methods to support the 
inaugural speech as coherently as possible, but the final goal, 
practically, overturns the way we look at the work and forces us to go 
beyond the norm, to try to understand the good in terms of its factual 
implications, in the order of the daily life. Henceforth it follows that my 
answer to happiness can only be stated in terms of overcoming it. It 
represents that all of the present throughout is a way of leaving the 
door open to possible philosophical confrontations. So, happiness, as 
it appears in the context I thought, is related to activity. If the 
individual has no part of activity, then he cannot "exercise" his virtue. 
So, to harvest the fruits of his own activity. This means that pleasure 
cannot be perceived if it is not first set in motion by activity, and then 
by direct connection with virtue, to be perfected. 
3. Conclusion  
Let's take the example of a pianist. We can say about him that 
he is virtuous, that he never misses a note, that his music is perfect. 
But we can't know how many hours he spent repeating, how much he 
struggled, how much he tried to honor his status. In other words, for 
the pianist to be virtuous, he must, first of all, be a pianist, so he must 
have an activity. Secondly, he must master all the grips, the 
implications of his activity, so to find the right environment, to have a 
gift, a sense, so to be virtuous. Third, he must feel pleasure. And how 
can the pleasure be obtained? Very simple. From his activity 
intertwined with virtue, pleasure also appears. In this case, pleasure 
can appear when we are dealing with appreciation.  Obviously, the 
pianist's appreciation is closely related to his activity, and hence, to 
his virtue. A man cannot be virtuous in his sleep, to paraphrase 
Aristotle. When he stated this, he was in fact saying that virtue can be 
virtue without calling to a confirmation. In the case of the pianist, the 
audience, those who appreciate him, all those around his activity, and 
not only, become responsible for his virtuosity. That is why, in the 
tenth book, Aristotle appeals to pleasure. Every activity must be 
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crowned with pleasure, and then with success. In my opinion, the 
happiness in this book cannot be perceived outside the activity or the 
movement. I believe that, in The Nicomachean Ethics, happiness 
does not simply arise, but depends on the way of forcing the 
individual, on the way he chooses to position himself, and this would 
be the act. Without action, happiness would no longer be happiness. 
A fulfilled man cannot sit on a chair forever. 
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